# Web Application Security

#### James Walden

Northern Kentucky University waldenj@nku.edu



# Is your web site secure?




Yes, we deployed SSL, firewall, etc.

- Does SSL protect all communications?
- What about stored data?
- What about injection attacks and XSS?



#### Firewalls don't protect web apps





#### Yes, we're certified as being secure.

- PCI scans quarterly; apps change weekly.
- Geeks.com, certified HackerSafe by McAfee, lost thousands of CCs in 2007.





Yes, we have logs of blocked attacks.

- Better, you have some real evidence.
- Did you log non-blocked requests too?



- Yes, we have a SDLC and record network,
- host, and application-based logs.
  - Secure Development LifeCycle
    - Risk analysis
    - Secure design
    - Code reviews
    - Security testing
  - Correlate logs for multi-perspective picture.






- 1. The Problem of Software Security
- 2. Web Application Vulnerabilities
- 3. SQL Injection
- 4. Software Security Practices




### Reasons for Attacking Web Apps

Attack Goal	%
Stealing Sensitive	42%
Information	
Defacement	23%
Planting Malware	15%
Unknown	8%
Deceit	3%
Blackmail	3%
Link Spam	3%
Worm	1%
Phishing	1%
Information	1%
Warfare	



### A Growing Problem





March 4, 2008

ISACA



### Web Application Exploits 2007







#### The source of the problem


"Malicious hackers don't create security holes; they simply exploit them. Security holes and vulnerabilities – the real root cause of the problem – are the result of bad software design and implementation."

John Viega & Gary McGraw



### Web Application Vulnerabilities

Attack/Vulnerability Used	%
SQL Injection	20%
Unintentional Information Disclosure	17%
Known Vulnerability	15%
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)	12%
Insufficient Access Control	10%
Credential/Session Prediction	8%
OS Commanding	3%
Misconfiguration	3%
Insufficient Anti- automation	3%
Denial of Service	3%
Redirection	2%
Insufficient Session Expiration	2%
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	2%







 Injection attacks trick an application into including unintended commands in the data send to an interpreter.

#### Interpreters

- Interpret strings as commands.
- Ex: SQL, shell (cmd.exe, bash), LDAP, XPath

#### Key Idea


 Input data from the application is executed as code by the interpreter.



## **SQL** Injection

- 1. App sends form to user.
- 2. Attacker submits form with SQL exploit data.
- 3. Application builds string with exploit data.
- Application sends SQL query to DB.
- DB executes query, including exploit, sends data back to application.
- 6. Application returns data to user.







## SQL Injection in PHP

\$link = mysql\_connect(\$DB\_HOST, \$DB\_USERNAME, \$DB\_PASSWORD) or die ("Couldn't connect: " . mysql\_error()); mysql select db(\$DB\_DATABASE);

\$query = "select count(\*) from users where username =
'\$username' and password = '\$password''';

\$result = mysql\_query(\$query);



#### SQL Injection Attack #1

**Unauthorized Access Attempt:** password = 'or 1=1 --SQL statement becomes: select count(\*) from users where username = 'user' and password = '' or 1=1 --Checks if password is empty OR 1=1, which is always true, permitting access.



#### SQL Injection Attack #2

#### Database Modification Attack:

password = foo'; delete from table users where
username like '%

#### DB executes *two* SQL statements:

select count(\*) from users where username = 'user'
and password = 'foo'

delete from table users where username like '%'



#### **SQL** Injection Demo

# **SQL Injection Demo**



March 4, 2008

ISACA

### Impact of SQL Injection


#### SELECT SSN FROM USERS WHERE UID='\$UID'

INPUT	RESULT
5	Returns info for user with UID 5.
' OR 1=1	Returns info for all users.
<sup>•</sup> UNION SELECT Field FROM Table WHERE 1=1	Returns all rows from another table.
';DROP TABLE USERS	Deletes the users table.
ʻ;master.dbo.xp_c mdshell ʻcmd.exe format c: /q /yes'	Formats C: drive of database server if you're running MS SQL Server and extended procedures aren't disabled.



## Impact of SQL Injection

- 1. Leakage of sensitive information.
- 2. Reputation decline.
- 3. Modification of sensitive information.
- 4. Loss of control of db server.
- 5. Data loss.
- 6. Denial of service.





## The Problem: String Building

Building a SQL command string with user input in any language is dangerous.

- Variable interpolation.
- String concatenation with variables.
- String format functions like sprintf().
- String templating with variable replacement.



## Mitigating SQL Injection

#### **Partially Effective Mitigations**

Blacklists Stored Procedures

#### **Effective Mitigations**


Whitelists Prepared Queries




#### **Software Security Practices**

- 1. Code Reviews 1.
- 2. Risk Analysis 2. Abuse Cases
- 3. Penetration Testing 3. Security Operations

Security Testing



#### **Code Reviews**



ISACA




#### **Benefits of Code Reviews**

- Find defects sooner in development lifecycle. (IBM finds 82% of defects before testing.)
- Find defects with less effort than testing.
   (IBM—review: 3.5 hrs/bug, testing: 15-25 hrs/bug.)
- Find different defects than testing.(Can identify some design problems too.)
- 4. Educate developers about security bugs.(Developers frequently make the same mistakes.)



#### **Static Analysis**

Automated assistance for code reviews Speed: review code faster than humans can Accuracy: hundreds of secure coding rules






#### Architectural Risk Analysis

Fix design flaws, not implementation bugs.

- 1. Develop an architecture model.
- 2. Model threats and attack scenarios.
- 3. Rank risks based on probability and impact.
- 4. Develop mitigation strategy.



## **Threat Modeling**

- 1. Identify System Assets.
  - System resources that an adversary might attempt to access, modify, or steal.
  - Ex: credit cards, network bandwidth, user access.
- 2. Identify Entry Points.
  - Data or control transfers between systems.
  - Ex: network sockets, RPCs, web forms, files
- 3. Determine Trust Levels.
  - Privileges external entities have to legitimately use system resources.




### **Penetration Testing**

Test software in deployed environment by attacking it.

Allocate time at end of development to test.

- Time-boxed: test for *n* days.
- May be done by an external consultant.




KENTUCKY

## Security Testing


Different from penetration testing

- White box (source code is available.)
- Use risk analysis to build tests.
- Measure security against risk model.




KENTUCKY

### Security Testing





#### Abuse Cases



ISACA

KENTUCKY


### **Security Operations**

#### Deploying security

- Secure default configuration.
- Web application firewall for defense in depth.

#### Incident response

- What happens when a vulnerability is reported?
- How do you communicate with users?



#### Conclusions

- Web applications are a primary target.
  - Sensitive information
  - Defacement
  - Malware distribution
- Software Security ≠ Security Features
  - SSL will not make your site secure.
  - Firewalls will not make your site secure.
- Improving software development
  - Code reviews.
  - Risk analysis.
  - Security testing.



#### References

- 1. Mark Dowd, John McDonald, Justin Schuh, *The Art of Software Security Assessment*, Addison-Wesley, 2007.
- 2. Mitre, Common Weaknesses Vulnerability Trends, http://cwe.mitre.org/documents/vuln-trends.html, 2007.
- Gary McGraw, *Software Security*, Addison-Wesley, 2006.
- J.D. Meier, et. al., *Improving Web Application Security: Threats and Countermeasures*, Microsoft, http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa302418.aspx, 2006.
- OWASP Top 10, http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\_Top\_Ten\_Project, 2007.
- Ivan Ristic, Web Application Firewalls: When Are They Useful?, OWASP AppSec EU 2006.
- Joel Scambray, Mike Shema, and Caleb Sima, *Hacking Exposed: Web Applications, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition*, Addison-Wesley, 2006.
- Dafydd Stuttard and Marcus Pinto, *Web Application Hacker's Handbook*, Wiley, 2007.
- WASC, "Web Application Incidents Annual Report 2007," https://bsn.breach.com/downloads/whid/The%20Web%20Hacking%20Incide , 2008.

